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From The Core To The Fringe? The Political Role of Libyan Youth During And After 
The Revolution 
Anna Lührmann 
In 2011, Libyan youth activists – armed and unarmed – were at the core of the revolution and 
vigorously demanded the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Many harbored idealistic expectations for a 
rapid transformation of the country and immediate and genuine inclusion in political and economic 
processes. The first transitional elections took place in July 2012. It seems that the political 
representation of youth in Libya was higher during the revolution than in the formal institutions of 
the “New Libya”. How has the political participation of young Libyans evolved during and after the 
revolution? Youth political participation refers here to the meaningful and effective inclusion of 
relatively young people in the decision-making process. This broad youth definition includes anyone 
between 15 and 35. Youth political participation can be divided into consultative, youth-led or 
collaborative youth participation (Lührmann 2013: 16, based on Hart 1992, Landsdown 2010, Karkara 
2011). In this paper, the main focus is on collaborative youth participation, which refers to young 
people being effectively included in regular political decision-making processes (e.g. as voters, as 
Members of Parliament (MPs), as members of political parties or advocacy groups).  
In many countries, we can observe the following phenomena: Youth tend to be active on the streets, 
but continue to be marginalized in formal decision-making bodies. In transitional processes, 
significant frustration is likely to arise if youth are not included in new formal decision-making 
procedures. This might have a destabilizing effect on the democratization process and accelerate 
conflict dynamics. It is therefore important to understand barriers to the political participation of 
youth. Barriers can be found on various levels - individual, organizational and structural (UNDP 2008: 
6). This approach will serve as the analytical framework for the second part of the paper. This paper 
draws on three field visits to Tripoli that included discussions with Libyan civil society 
representatives, MPs, civil servants as well as representatives of the international community.1 The 
empirical analysis is enhanced with data from the 6th Wave of the World Value Survey. The 
conceptual framework draws from a recent publication on youth political participation on behalf of 
UNDP (Lührmann 2013). As of spring 2014, the political situation in Libya has become highly chaotic 
and all formal governance institutions are highly contested (Lacher 2014). Hence, this article 
addresses the revolutionary period in 2011 and the brief period of relative calm in post-Gaddafi Libya 
until the ouster of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March 2014. 
Taking stock: Political participation of youth during and after the revolution in Libya   
1. Revolutionary Period (February 2011 - July 2012) 
Inspired by the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, a mostly young movement of Libyans started mobilizing for a 
“Day of Revolt” on February 17, protesting against the human rights violations of the Gadhafi regime 
(Lindgren 2013: 210). The arrest of a young human rights activist, Fathi Terbil, on February 15 further 
fueled protests.2 The February 17 movement quickly spread throughout the country. Protests were 
met with severe repression and military action from the side of the regime. During the following civil 
                                                            
1  5-12 July 2012, 6-13 October 2012 and 25-29 January 2013. 
2 BBC Online, 16.2.11. 
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war, youth took vital roles in the armed militias, media and online activism as well as in humanitarian 
aid work.3  The Libyan Youth Movement and other young activists used social media for mobilization 
and self-organization. There are some indications that these activities played a vital role for the 
revolution. Lindgren shows in an in-depth analysis of tweets on 17 February how twitter helped 
activists to subvert Libya’s restricted media landscape (Lindgren 2013). The majority of Libyans below 
35 indicate in 2013 that they use the Internet daily.4 Hence, chances are high that online mobilization 
reached many youth in 2011. Facebook also provided a platform for the Libyan Youth Movement to 
share news and develop their political agenda (Sommer et al 2013). However, only a small fraction of 
Libyans seem to have used Facebook in 2010: 2,4 % according to The Guardian (2014). Additionally, 
the Libyan Youth Movement may have been highly relevant in the initial days of the uprising, but did 
not emerge as a leading actor in the revolutionary struggle. Hence, online and youth-led activities 
probably played a vital role in the early days of the Libyan revolution, but they also should not be 
overrated. Gaddafi did not fall because of twitter but because people took to the streets and because 
of the civil war and NATO’s military intervention.  
Already during the revolution, youth were sidelined in important decision-making bodies. In the main 
governance authority of the revolution and later of the first months of post-Gaddafi Libya – the 
National Transitional Council (NTC) – Fathi Terbil apparently was the only youth representative 
present (Murphy 2011). Elder men representing their cities and tribes seemed to dominate the NTC. 
Traditional non-state governance institutions, such as tribal leadership, are often based on seniority 
or lineage and hence tend not to encourage the inclusion of youth in political decision-making. After 
the liberation of Tripoli, an interim government under Abdurrahim El-Keib took office in November 
2011. In his cabinet, the above-mentioned young human rights activist, Fathi Terbil, became Minister 
of Youth. After a brief discussion with him in Tripoli in October 2012, it remained unclear if and how 
he actually tried or managed to feed youth views in the interim government's decision-making.   
2. First Transitional Elections and Their Aftermath (July 2012 - Nov 2012)  
The first transitional election in Libya took place on July 7, 2012. 82% of all eligible voters registered 
and 62% of registered persons turned out to vote (EU EAT 2012: 14, 34). Apparently, “Libyans 
needed to vote.”5 Local and international observers (Grifa 2012) consistently describe the 
atmosphere in Libya during the election day and shortly afterwards as “party time”.6 Overall, the 
elections were perceived as a central achievement of the revolution. 
On 8 August 2012, the General National Congress took over power from the National Transitional 
Council. Congress members had been elected in competitive, multi-party elections. There were 
several Members of Parliament below the age of 30. Particularly on women’s and political party lists, 
young candidates had a chance. For example, Hana Jibril, a 26-year-old dentist from Misrata, served 
on the Budget Committee. However, the overall representation of the mostly young revolutionary 
fighters in the GNC was "weak" (Lacher 2013). The former revolutionary fighters still enjoyed a high 
                                                            
3  Der Tagespiegel, 14.10.12. 
4  Data from the 6th wave oft he World Value Survey (2013); Frequency of internet use as information source (Under 35/ Over 35): 
50%/24% Daily; 11/9% Weekly; 6/5% Monthly; 4/5 % Less than monthly; 30/58% Never; Non-responses are excluded (3%).   
5  Personal communication, Western diplomat, Tripoli 9.7.12 
6          BBC News, 7.7.12. 
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degree of public trust and admiration, but were largely excluded from the official institutions of the 
“New Libya”.  
3. Government of Ali Zeidan (November 2012 - March 2014)  
Following the elections, it took the General National Congress until November 2012 to appoint a 
Prime Minister - Ali Zeidan - and to approve his cabinet.7 In Ali Zeidan’s cabinet, no minister was 
below 40 years old. The Minister for Youth and Sports, Abdulsalam Abdullah Guaila, was 45 years old 
when he took office.8 He left the cabinet together with other members of the Justice and 
Construction Party (Libyan Muslim Brotherhood) in January 2014.9 Little is known about his work. I 
was only able to find the following tweet about his ministry: “Was Stuck in traffic near sports + youth 
ministry #Libya. Youngest in or out at least 50 and if obesity is a sport they'd get the gold medal.” 
(@misrati_free on twitter; 30.8.13). Some civil society organisations (CSO) featuring youth leaders or 
youth issues were established during and after the revolution (Clément et al 2013). Nevertheless, 
elder men seem to dominate the political debates in post-revolutionary Libya, for example the Grand 
Mufti Sadeq Al-Ghariani (Lacher 2013). 
Public Opinion  
Regardless of this underrepresentation of youth and tremendous governance problems, such as the 
deteriorating security situation, the vast majority of young Libyans (64%) still seemed to believe that 
their revolution was “successful” in summer 2013. This is the finding of an opinion poll conducted by 
the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies in April/Mai 2013.10 According to this poll, only 24% of Libyan youth 
think that their country needs a “revision of leadership.” Likewise, only 11% of young Libyans are 
reported to believe that the elections were not free and fair as opposed to 38% of Egyptians. 
According to this poll, the motives for revolution also differ in the three North African countries. In 
Libya, most respondents cite civil and political rights, whereas in Tunisia dignity and economic 
conditions were on the minds of youth. In Egypt, corruption was the main concern reported.11  
The recent wave of the World Value Survey, conducted in Libya in 2013, with a total of 2131 
respondents, allows further insights into Libyan public opinion in this crucial phase of Libya’s history 
(WVS). About half of the respondents are below 35 years (45%). 38% of young respondents state 
they have attended peaceful demonstrations as opposed to 26% of respondents above 35 (see Figure 
1). This resonates with the picture of a “youth revolt.” The data also reflects the recent wave of 
political activism in Libya. The 6th Wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) records attitudes for 39 
different countries on the question of participation in political demonstrations. Among all countries, 
Libya is the country with the highest share of respondents claiming they have attended a peaceful 
demonstration in the past. On average across the world, 12% of respondents claim to have attended 
peaceful demonstrations compared to 30% in Libya.  
 
                                                            
7  Libya Herald, 3.11.12. 
8  Libya Herald, 3.11.12. 
9  Al Ahram, 21.1.14. 
10  AJE, 30.7.13. 
11  AJE, 30.7.13. 
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Figure 1: Attitudes towards Attending Peaceful Political Demonstrations in Libya 2013 (WVS) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from 6th Wave of World Value Survey (N=2, 131). The survey participants declining to answer this 
question are not included here (3%; “Don’t know” or “No answer”).    
The World Value Survey also provides some indications about the societal position of youth. On the 
one hand, 62% of respondents state that most people in Libya would place people in their 20s at a 
rather low position in society. Correspondingly, 61% would place people in their 40s at a relatively 
high position. This suggests that there might be a cultural barrier to a higher participation of youth in 
politics. On the other hand, 69% of respondents state that most people in Libya would accept it if a 
“suitably qualified 30 year old” was appointed as their boss. Similarly, 65% agree or strongly agree 
that “old people have too much political influence” (Figure 2). The age group of respondents does 
not matter for the response rates described in this paragraph. These findings suggest that Libyan 
society might be willing to accept more youth political leadership in the future, even though they 
describe the current societal position of youth as relatively low. 
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Figure 2: "Old People Have too Much Political Power" (WVS Libya 2013) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from 6th Wave of World Value Survey (N=2,131). The survey participants declining to answer to this 
question are not included here (9%; “Don’t know” or “No answer”).    
Youth marginalization in post-Gaddafi Libya: Reasons and Ways Ahead   
Based on the empirical findings, the initial thesis – political representation of youth in Libya was 
higher during the revolution than after - needs to be modified. Youth representation during the 
revolutionary period and after the election was actually quite similar. Both during and after the 
revolution, the important role that youth played in the streets and in the militias was not translated 
into important roles in more formal decision-making bodies. What are the reasons behind this 
misbalance? In many other countries, we can observe similar phenomena. Youth are active in the 
streets and continue to be marginalized in formal decision-making bodies (Ellis 2007, Golombeck 
2002, MacKinnon et al 2007). Barriers to youth political participation may be found on three levels: 
individual, organizational and structural (UNDP 2008:6). 
The level of individual capacity is a starting point for explanation. The mere presence of youth in 
formal institutions (e.g. as MPs) is not enough. Rather, elected representatives need the capacities 
and skills to effectively participate in the decision-making process. Here, young people can often be 
sidelined if they lack knowledge or technical skills to participate meaningfully. However, in Libya in 
2012 this point should not have been relevant, as all MPs were new to their job. Youth 
representatives also have the advantage that they were not involved in high ranks of the Gaddafi 
regime and hence may have a higher credibility. Therefore it is actually surprising that the Libyan 
  
 
 
Youth, Revolt, Recognition. The Young Generation during and after the „Arab Spring“. 
Berlin 2015: Mediterranean Institute Berlin (MIB)/Humboldt University Berlin, edited volume by Isabel Schäfer. 
32 
 
interim authorities did not tap into the fresh resource of young personnel more often. During the 
transition process in Eastern Europe, young technocrats quickly rose to become ministers in the 
1990s. Particularly in the light of Libya’s Integrity Law, the Eastern European experience might be an 
interesting inspiration for the Libyan case. The Integrity Law, passed in May 2013, excluded anyone 
with responsible positions under Gaddafi from political offices and hence decimated the pool of 
available political leadership personnel (Lacher 2014: 2). This opportunity to give young people more 
political responsibility was regrettably missed. 
On the organizational level, functioning civil society organizations or political parties that may be 
intermediaries between the youth population and the political elites are lacking. There are some 
active youth civil society organizations (e.g. H2O), but their outreach to youth particularly outside of 
a narrow elite is doubtful. Instead, many young people continue to be organized in armed militias. 
With weapons in their hand they storm ministries and parliaments in order to fight for their demands 
– often successfully.12 It will be critical for the “New Libya” to find a way to channel political 
grievances in peaceful and constructive deliberation processes. This would also foster the meaningful 
engagement of youth. 
The restrained political role of youth might also be attributed to patriarchal social constraints in the 
societal environment, giving limited room to the equal participation of youth and women. The 
transition from childhood to adulthood in the MENA region is often characterized as period of 
“waithood.” Young men spend their most energetic years waiting for a job in order to be eligible for 
marriage. Due to persistent political and social exclusion, youth are left in a passive state (UNDP 
Egypt 2010). The revolution has not managed to break away all of these barriers. The analysis of the 
World Value Survey data suggests that young people still have a lower social status in Libya than 
people in their 40s. However, the survey data also shows that a vast majority of Libyans seems to 
believe that the older generation holds too much political power. This discontent might eventually 
lead to behavioral and social change, and allow for the inclusion of youth in the political process. 
Additionally, it has to be considered that Libyan society is deeply fragmented into numerous groups – 
tribal, religious, regional (Lacher 2013). It is probably safe to assume that for many youth the 
similarities with other, older people from their alliance are higher than with other youth from 
opposing (political) groups. In other words, factors other than age might matter more for political 
identity and societal cleavages.  
Conclusion 
Compared to their vital role during the revolution, the inclusion of youth in formal decision-making 
bodies in post-revolutionary Libya was meager. This can be attributed to various factors, mainly in 
the organizational and structural realm. In order to further shed light on this issue a comparison with 
neighboring Egypt might be fruitful. The solution to end youth exclusion from political processes 
does not lie in the capacities of individual youth alone. Political structures and processes have to 
change in order to include the voices of young people and their procedural preferences. In a nutshell, 
the socio-political environment, organizations and youth all have to change in order to move closer 
together. Unfortunately, many activities aimed at enhancing youth political participation target 
                                                            
12 Libya Herald, 12.2.13. 
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individual capacities only and neglect the social and political environment. This is not enough to 
substantially enhance youth political participation.  
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